Asfalterar politiker inför val? : En studie av synliga investeringar och politiska budgetcykler i mellanstora svenska kommuner

Sammanfattning

This study examines whether municipal investments in medium-sized Swedish municipalities are influenced by electoral cycles, that is, whether politicians adjust investments prior to elections in order to increase the likelihood of being re-elected. The study is based on the theory of political budget cycles, which suggests that politicians have incentives to prioritize visible investments that are easily observed by voters, and is complemented by a public choice perspective emphasizing strategic behavior. The purpose of the study is to analyze whether such patterns occur in Swedish municipalities, and if so, whether they take the form of increases in total investments prior to elections or rather a reallocation between different types of investments. To investigate this, investments in eight medium-sized municipalities are analyzed over the period 2015-2024. Investments are divided into visible, less visible, and total investments. The quantitative analysis is conducted using panel data and fixed-effects models and is complemented by interviews with municipal officials in four Swedish municipalities. The results show that visible investments to some extent tend to be higher in connection with election years, but the relationships are weak and not robust. Less visible investments in some cases exhibit lower levels during the same periods, which may indicate a reallocation within the municipal budget. However, these results are sensitive to model specification and should therefore be interpreted with caution. At the same time, the analysis shows that the total level of investments does not change notably in connection with elections, which implies that any changes are not due to municipalities investing more overall, but rather to how resources are allocated. The interviews show that investment decisions are largely shaped by long-term planning, practical conditions, and organizational factors, which limit the possibility of adjusting investments in response to the electoral cycle. At the same time, there are examples indicating that visible investments in some cases may be prioritized for strategic reasons. Overall, the study provides limited support for the existence of political budget cycles in municipal investments. If such cycles exist, they appear primarily as weak and irregular reallocations rather than clear increases in the total level of investments.