Critical Space Infrastructure : The Political Economy of Satellite Communication Risks to the European Union

Sammanfattning

Satellite systems are critical infrastructure essential to global connectivity and secure governmental, military, and civilian communication. The EU currently lags in space capabilities investment and depends on external satellite communication (SATCOM). Scholars and policymakers increasingly fear that such dependency might be weaponised in intensifying great power competition. While IR scholarship emphasises space powers, this study analyses a structurally vulnerable actor, using Strange's framework to categorise risks resulting from power asymmetries. According to structural power theory, power is embedded in four key structures: security, production, finance, and knowledge. This study operationalises these structures of power as structures of risk, revealing how vulnerability embeds in structures of the world economy. In doing so, I categorise risks for analytical clarity. Farrell and Newman’s weaponised interdependence is used to explain how reliance can be leveraged by a hostile actor. This deductive qualitative content analysis categorises EU-identified SATCOM risks. I demonstrate that certain risks function as lawful mechanisms of exploitation and that hostile actors can leverage these risks alongside deliberate malicious hostile activities. Given EU SATCOM dependency on the US and private actors, I emphasise the ambiguity between sabotage and technical error, which can lead to unintended conflict escalation. Actor type in space likewise proves significant in revealing structural vulnerabilities.