Förhandling mellan stater: politisk norm eller bindande rättsregel? : En teoretisk och praktisk analys av förhandlingsplikten enligt artikel 2 (3) FN-stadgan

Sammanfattning

Article 2 (3) of the UN Charter constitutes an important part of international law by establishing that all international conflicts should be solved through peaceful means. The idea behind the creation of the United Nations was to bring states together in order to prevent international conflicts. This thesis therefore works through the lens of principled negotiation theory – which goal is for the negotiating parties to bridge their gap rather than for one party to ‘win’ said negotiation – to analyze and assess article 2 (3). The thesis begins by analyzing the legal nature of article 2 (3). Through an analysis of jurisprudence from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) the study identifies the core elements of the negotiation obligation, such as the requirement of good faith and active participation, while also noting the absence of proper procedural requirements. The Court’s deliberately flexible approach can be explained by a concern for state sovereignty and cultural diversity. The thesis contains three empirical studies of real-life conflicts to analyze the practical application of the article. These are the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the 2011 intervention in Libya, and the 2010 non-violent dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. These cases illustrate different ways in which article 2 (3) has failed its purpose. These include, but are not limited to, the lack of enforcement mechanisms, the politicization of the UN Security Council, the impact of Chapter VII mandates on negotiation dynamics, and the low threshold required to satisfy the obligation under existing jurisprudence. Building on these findings, the thesis argues that the limited effectiveness of article 2 (3) reflects the broader problem of finding a system of peaceful conflict resolution without forcing states to give up their sovereignty. With this in mind, the final chapter explores realistic ways to strengthen the article’s position, such as clarifying minimum standards through soft law, enhancing the role of regional actors in facilitating negotiations, and relying on incentives rather than sanctions to promote compliance. The thesis finally concludes that while article 2 (3) in itself cannot – and should not – act like a coercive mechanism, it does bring significant normative value. Strengthening it in a legitimacy-enhancing way will reinforce the UN Charter’s foundational commitment to the peaceful settlement of international disputes.