From the Copenhagen Criteria to the Copenhagen Dilemma : The Origins of the Problem withDemocratic Safeguards in the European Union

Sammanfattning

This thesis investigates the historical and institutional origins of the European Union’s weaksafeguards against democratic backsliding, known as the ‘Copenhagen Dilemma’. Despite the EU’sformal commitment to democracy and the rule of law, its main enforcement instrument, Article 7TEU, has proven largely ineffective. The study therefore asks: Why was the EU not designed withstrong safeguards against democratic backsliding?The thesis employs a qualitative single-case study using theory-testing process tracing to analysetreaty reforms in the 1990s. Two explanations are examined: a Social Constructivist hypothesis(H1), which links weak safeguards to post-Cold War optimism and the assumption that liberaldemocracy was an irreversible end-state; and a Liberal Intergovernmentalist hypothesis (H2),which argues that Member States intentionally limited supranational authority to protect nationalsovereignty.Drawing on primary sources, including the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, Jacques Delors’s1990 speech, and documents from the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, the analysis showsthat the EU’s weak enforcement framework resulted from both normative assumptions andstrategic design choices. A presumption of democratic stability made robust oversight appearunnecessary, while Member States simultaneously ensured political control over enforcementthrough permissive treaty language and unanimity requirements.The thesis concludes that sovereignty protection provides the stronger explanation for the EU’sinstitutional design. These findings clarify the origins of the Copenhagen Dilemma and explain whythe EU remains structurally constrained in addressing democratic backsliding among its MemberStates.