Lögn & intention : Vilken roll spelar intention vid definitionen av lögn?

Sammanfattning

The aim of this paper is to examine the role of intention in the definition of lying. The traditional view holds that a necessary condition for lying is the speaker’s intention to deceive the audience. This paper argues that so-called bald-faced lies challenge this condition, since they are lies where the speaker lacks the intention to deceive. One definition that is designed to account for bald-faced lies is Thomas L. Carson’s definition of a warranting context. While Carson’s view successfully explains why bald-faced lies count as lies, this paper argues that it fails to account for cases such as the “Confused Politician II”. Carson’s definition fails because it does not include the requirement that the speaker intends to violate this warranting context. Drawing on Don Fallis’ understanding of assertion and Andreas Stokke’s view on common ground, this paper argues that intention remains central to the definition of lying, not in the traditional sense of intending to deceive. The relevant intention is that the speaker intends to assert something false in a warranting context. Lying is therefore the intention to violate this context.