NOT (ALWAYS) A LAST RESORT? : The Effects of Rebel Group Strength on Forced Recruitment

Sammanfattning

While mainstream accounts treat forced recruitment as a measure of last resort, recent studies suggest, somewhat counterintuitively, that strong rebel groups are more likely to adopt it. This thesis seeks to explain why strong groups might resort to a supposedly costly tactic. I argue that rebel groups that are both militarily strong and exercise a high degree of territorial control are more likely to systematically use forced recruitment, as such groups have both the incentive and the capacity to do so. The incentive stems from the need to defend territory, which requires more conventional tactics that increase manpower demands. The capacity increases as strong groups are better able to suppress and mitigate the costs of civilian backlash. Strong rebel groups should also be able to implement effective retention mechanisms to prevent desertion of forced recruits. Using structured focused comparison and process-tracing, I find that military strength and territorial control are associated with a higher likelihood and greater extent of forced recruitment, with mixed support for the proposed causal mechanisms. Given theoretical and methodological constraints, these findings should be treated with caution and point to the need for further research.