Remote Coercive Control and the Limits of States’ Positive Obligations under the European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence on Domestic Violence

Sammanfattning

This thesis examines whether the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) can adequately respond to technology-facilitated domestic abuse through its existing framework of States’ positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The study focuses specifically on ‘remote coercive control’, a specific form of abuse in which digital technologies are used to exercise ongoing surveillance, intimidation, control, and psychological pressure within intimate relationships without requiring physical proximity between the perpetrator and the victim. Examples include the use of spyware and monitoring applications, unauthorised access to email and social media accounts, GPS tracking, and other forms of digital surveillance. The analysis begins from the observation that domestic violence has traditionally been understood through visible physical violence and separate incidents of harm. However, digital technologies such as smartphones, spyware, GPS tracking, social media platforms, and online communication tools have changed the conditions under which abuse occurs. Abuse may now continue remotely, continuously, and invisibly, even after physical separation. The thesis analyses the ECtHR’s domestic violence jurisprudence, particularly under Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR, and examines recent judgments concerning technology-facilitated abuse (Buturugă v Romania, Volodina v Russia (No. 2), and M.Ș.D. v Romania). It argues that the ECtHR’s existing framework is formally capable of addressing remote coercive control, particularly through the flexibility of Articles 3 and 8. However, significant conceptual tensions emerge when traditional legal concepts are applied to digitally mediated abuse. The Court’s framework remains largely structured around visible, physically proximate, and incident-based forms of violence, whereas remote coercive control operates through continuous, cumulative, and often invisible forms of psychological harm. Consequently, the thesis concludes that the principal issue is not the absence of legal protection, but the need for more context-sensitive interpretation of existing doctrinal concepts in response to evolving forms of digital abuse.