Uncertain Guarantees : Assessing the Impact of Guarantor-Recipient Alignment on Non-Proliferation

Sammanfattning

Security guarantees are an effective and widely used tool of nuclear non-proliferation, yet quantitative research has previously treated them as a binary condition, without examining what determines their perceived credibility. This study addresses that gap by exploring what shapes a recipient’s confidence in a security guarantee. Drawing on security guarantee and alliance literature, this study proposes a theory of interest alignment, testing a hypothesis that greater alignment increases a recipient’s confidence in its guarantee, reducing the incentive to pursue independent nuclear capabilities. The theory is tested using the Bleek and Lorber (2014) dataset, and original dyadic variables capturing economic, strategic, and values alignment. OLS, logit, and Firth penalized logit models are estimated across pooled, lagged, and fixed effects specifications. Findings offer mixed support: values alignment and elements of economic interconnectedness show negative relationships with proliferation behaviour in the recipient, while strategic alignment variables produce counterintuitive results. In addition, findings reveal that within-guarantee variation across time has little effect on recipient proliferation behaviour, suggesting onset conditions matter more than within-guarantee shifts. The study concludes by drawing out implications for contemporary alliance strain and non-proliferation policy.