When Pressure Is Permitted : Asymmetric Leverage and the International Legitimacy of Manipulative Mediation

Sammanfattning

Existing research has examined why, when, and how mediators resort to manipulative strategies, yet comparatively little attention has been paid to how such tactics shape the legitimacy of the mediation process, especially within the international community. This thesis explores this gap by asking under what conditions manipulative mediation affects the international legitimacy of mediation processes. More specifically, it addresses the point when concrete settlement proposals are presented to the international community. Drawing on mediation and legitimacy scholarship, it argues that asymmetric leverage, when the mediator’s pressure is primarily concentrated on one conflict party, undermines confidence in the mediator’s ability to deliver a genuine settlement, thereby reducing legitimacy. The hypothesis is examined through a structured focused comparison of mediation efforts led by United States President Donald Trump in the Israel-Hamas and Ukraine-Russia conflicts. The findings provide partial support for the theorised relationship. While the Ukraine-Russia case, characterised by higher asymmetric leverage, is associated with lower international legitimacy, the Israel-Hamas case displays comparatively higher legitimacy despite a moderate degree of asymmetry in leverage. This suggests that asymmetric leverage alone is insufficient to explain variation in international legitimacy, indicating the need for further research into additional causal factors and interaction effects.