A Secret War : How US Government Organizations Shaped Strategic Thinking in the Laos Crisis

Sammanfattning

This thesis examines how American strategic thinking in the Laos Crisis was shaped by the Department of Defense, the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency during 1961-1963. While previous research has tended to focus on President Kennedy’s decisions, this study focuses strictly on the organizational level. Using a theoretical framework that identifies which traits of American strategic culture the organizations embodied, and which ways, ends and means they preferred, the study identifies differences and similarities between them. The results show that the different organizations embodied different cultural traits to some extent. In some instances, the same cultural traits were also expressed differently by the different organizations. Additionally, the organizations differed in preferred ways and means but not ends. These strategic preferences were, to some degree, influenced by the various cultural traits that the organizations embodied. Generally, the Department of Defense preferred using conventional military ways and means. This strategic preference initially manifested itself in a belief that aiding the regular Lao army, despite its repeated setbacks, would be a viable course of action. As the shortcomings of the regular Lao forces became apparent, the Department of Defense then suggested a swift US military intervention in Laos. The State Department was more inclined to rely on diplomacy, but later began to favor covert operations. The CIA was not as outspoken in its strategic preferences, but its intelligence was skeptical of the regular Lao army and positive towards the irregular Hmong forces, which were supported by covert operations. However, all three organizations were influenced by domino theory thinking and agreed on the strategic importance of achieving a neutral Laos.