Har USA hjälpt Talibanerna att komma till makten?

Sammanfattning

This study examines why the United States decided to negotiate with the Taliban and how this decision contributed to the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021. After nearly twenty years of military involvement following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States signed the Doha Agreement with the Taliban in February 2020. Although the agreement did not officially include a regime change, it created conditions that weakened the Afghan government and strengthened the Taliban (United States–Taliban Agreement, 2020; Snider, 2022). The purpose of this study is to analyze the U.S. decision to negotiate with a group that had long been classified as a terrorist organization. The study uses realism and rational choice theory as its theoretical framework to understand U.S. foreign policy decisions. A qualitative text analysis is applied, based on scientific articles, official documents, and reports from international organizations. The findings show that the U.S. decision was mainly driven by national interests and rational cost–benefit calculations. The war in Afghanistan had become very costly in economic, political, and military terms, and the U.S. no longer viewed continued involvement as beneficial. Negotiating with the Taliban was therefore seen as a practical solution to end the war and withdraw U.S. forces (Sahel, 2020; Snider, 2022). The study concludes that the U.S. did not support the Taliban for ideological reasons. Instead, the Taliban’s return to power was an indirect result of U.S. strategic priorities and the decision to leave Afghanistan. While this decision may be understood as rational from a U.S. perspective, it had serious consequences for Afghanistan and the Afghan population, especially regarding human rights and political stability (UNAMA, 2022).