Militär överlägsenhet utan seger : Strategisk interaktion i Afghanistan 2001-2014

Sammanfattning

Despite clear military superiority, the United States and NATO failed to achieve strategic success in Afghanistan 2001-2014. The conflict thus constitutes an important case within the study of asymmetric warfare. This study aims to explain this outcome by applying Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s theory of strategic interaction in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand. Based on a qualitative case study, this analysis examines how the US and NATO as the strong actor, and the Taliban as the weak actor, respectively employed direct and indirect strategies. The empirical material consists of five works in the form of books and reports, which is analyzed through an operationalization of four key asymmetric terms, direct attack, barbarism, direct defense and guerilla warfare. The findings show that NATO primarily employed a direct strategy by using conventional methods in combat operations aimed at the opponents’ military capabilities and strategic centers of gravity. The Taliban initially also employed a direct strategy but eventually shifted towards guerilla warfare, where sanctuaries, local support and the exploitation of time were key factors. The strategic interaction thus evolved from direct-direct, to direct-indirect, which tends to favor the weaker actor, according to Arreguín-Toft. This indicates that NATO’s military successes were temporary and could not be translated into long-term stability, while the Taliban’s adaptability and strategic acumen contributed to a protracted conflict and ultimately a strategic outcome in their favor. The study thereby contributes to increased understanding of strategic choices and how they interact in asymmetric conflicts.