Illiberal Efficiency or Democratic Stability? : A Comparative Study of Governance, Security and Development in El Salvador and Costa Rica

Sammanfattning

This thesis investigates how institutional structures shape state responses to crime reduction, national security, and economic performance in Central America, focusing on the comparative cases of El Salvador under Nayib Bukele and Costa Rica as an established liberal democracy. The central research question asks how and why these two countries differ in their approaches to security governance and what implications these differences have for economic outcomes. The study adopts a comparative institutionalist approach, drawing on secondary sources including official government documents, international organization reports, crime and economic statistics, and existing academic literature. By examining security policy design, institutional constraints, and economic indicators, the analysis situates observed outcomes within broader regime-level and governance structures rather than isolated policy choices. The findings show that El Salvadors rapid reduction in violent crimes has been enabled by a concentration of executive power and weakened institutional oversight, allowing for swift and coercive interventions. Costa Rica, by contrast, operates within a framework of strong legal accountability and democratic constraint, producing slower and more limited security outcomes but preserving institutional continuity. Economic effects differ accordingly, El Salvador has seem improvements in labor-market indicators without a clear break in GDP trends, while Costa Ricas growth reflects long-standing institutional stability rather than security policy shifts. The thesis concludes that security and economic outcomes are fundamentally conditioned by institutional environments, highlighting a governance paradox between rapid state capacity and democratic resilience.