Klara and the Sun : Whose knowledge counts?

Sammanfattning

This essay examines how Kazuo Ishiguro’s Klara and the Sun (2021) represents competing forms of knowledge in a technologically structured society. Through a thematic analysis of central scenes, the essay argues that the novel contrasts institutional knowledge, associated with scientific expertise, technological authority and social validation, with relational knowledge, developed through attentive observation of others. Attention is given to Klara’s perspective as an Artificial Friend (AF), since her marginalized position allows her to notice forms of vulnerability and social exclusion that other characters often overlook. The theoretical framework combines Michael Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge, Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics of responsibility, Michel Foucault’s theory of power/knowledge and Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice. These perspectives are used to examine how knowledge becomes linked to legitimacy, authority and credibility in the novel. The analysis focuses on Klara’s observations from the store, the Cootings Machine episode, the continuation project surrounding Josie, Mr. Paul, the interaction meeting and Klara’s final reflections in the Yard. The essay argues that Ishiguro does not reject institutional or scientific knowledge but exposes its limitations when it becomes the dominant measure of intelligence, identity and human value. Ultimately, Klara and the Sun suggests that meaningful understanding cannot be reduced to measurement, procedure or technological control alone, but also depends on relational knowledge that makes ethical responsibility possible.