Managing Elites, Governing States : Examining the Relationship Between Elite Turnover and Short-Term Sectoral Budgetary Volatility in Authoritarian Regimes

Sammanfattning

Elite turnover is a common feature in authoritarian politics, yet its consequences for policy outputs remain insufficiently understood. Previous research seeking to establish the relationship between elite turnover and budgetary allocations in communist and democratic regimes has produced mixed and theoretically underdeveloped results, leaving researchers in disagreement over whether this relationship exists or not. Recent research on authoritarian politics has, in turn, primarily focused on explaining the determinants and timing of elite turnover, while paying comparatively little attention to its consequences. Drawing on the theory of relative uncertainty, this study analyzes whether ministerial turnover is associated with short-term volatility in sectoral budgetary allocations in authoritarian regimes, and whether this relationship differs in authoritarian multiparty governments. Using cross-national time-series data covering 44 authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2023, this study applies quantitative panel methods to assess changes in the composition of military, health, and education spending. Moreover, this study analyzes how purges of Defense Ministers affect budgetary allocations in the military sector. The results demonstrate no systematic association between general ministerial turnover and sectoral budgetary volatility, nor evidence that this relationship is amplified in authoritarian multiparty governments. However, the findings suggest that purges of Defense Ministers are associated with a decrease in military spending in the following year. Taken together, these findings contribute to the understanding of the political consequences of elite turnover in authoritarian regimes.