PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS & POSITIVE INTUITIONS

Sammanfattning

The Meta-Problem of Consciousness asks why we think there is a Hard Problem of Consciousness (the problem of explaining how and why physical processes give rise to conscious experience). A solution to the meta-problem requires us to explain, in topic-neutral terms, why and how problematic intuitions about consciousness arise in beings like us, regardless of the reality of phenomenal consciousness (Chalmers 2018).Esa Diaz-Leon (2020) argues in favor of phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) as a solution to the meta-problem. David Chalmers (2020a) claims that while this response does a good job of explaining the existence of certain ‘negative’ intuitions about consciousness (intuitions regarding the derivability gap), it fails to explain other ‘positive’ intuitions about consciousness (intuitions regarding the metaphysical gap). This thesis paper aims to elaborate what more is needed from the PCS in order to explain the existence of positive intuitions, and to evaluate the potential of the PCS as a solution to the meta-problem. I conclude that, in its current state, PCS faces a principled difficulty when extended to account for the positive intuitions. Although experimental philosophy could, in principle, produce empirical support that would mitigate this difficulty, existing studies provide no compelling reason to expect such a rescue.