Runway to Nowhere? Explanatory Reach of Liberal Intergovernmentalism in FCAS Negotiations

Sammanfattning

Building on debates over whether external shocks, notably Russia’s war against Ukraine, drive deeper integration, the study probes claims that defence cooperation is best understood through domestically grounded state preferences and intergovernmental bargaining rather than supranational breakthroughs. The research adopts a qualitative, theory-driven design using minimalist process tracing and diagnostic tests (straw-in-the-wind, hoop, and smoking-gun) to assess LI’s first two stages: national preference formation and interstate bargaining. Empirical analysis is anchored in the French Senate Information Report No. 642 (2020), supplemented by selective official statements and specialist reporting. Findings indicate that FCAS delays are broadly consistent with LI. States share an overarching interest in cooperation, but diverge on issue-specific distributive questions that map onto domestic industrial structures and political constraints. Bargaining deadlock is driven less by informational scarcity or supranational entrepreneurship than by distributional conflict under asymmetrical interdependence, where delay so far constitutes a more viable strategy than exit. Overall, the study suggests LI plausibly accounts for cooperation dynamics in decentralized, project-based defence initiatives, helping explain why ambitious European defence projects can stall even under strong external pressure and shared strategic narratives.