Taktisk seger och nederlag i moderna konflikter

Sammanfattning

After Ukraine´s successful counteroffensive in Kharkiv 2022, hopes were raised for further successes when another offensive was planned for the following summer. The Zaporizhzhia offensive had been extensively prepared, while Ukraine had also received extensive Western support in the form of equipment, training and resources. Despite this, the expected success did not materialize and the offensive stalled long before the Ukrainian forces had reached their goals. This case raises the question of why Ukraine, despite favorable conditions and previous successes, failed to achieve success at the tactical level. The question becomes particularly relevant since the war has been characterized by new technological systems that have changed the complexity of the modern battlefield. The purpose of this study is therefore to explain why Ukraine’s counteroffensive resulted in the outcome that it did by answering the research question: How can the outcome of Ukraine´s counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia in 2023 be explained at the tactical level? The method that has been used is a qualitative text analysis based on Peter Thunholm´s and Lars Henåker´s theory, The Ideal model, whose sequences have formed the basis for a systematic analysis of both Ukrainian and Russian tactics. The results show that the outcome of the offensive can be explained as an interaction between the tactics of both actors. Extensive Russian defensive preparations, terrain favorable to the defending part and effective use of drones contributed to limited Ukrainian freedom of action, which made it more difficult to apply basic principles of offensive success such as maneuver, tempo and surprise. These findings suggest that further research should examine how technological development on the modern battlefield affects the conditions for success in combat and thereby also the development of new tactical theories.