Viet Congs krigföring i Vietnamkriget : En analys utifrån Mao Zedongs teori om folkkrig

Sammanfattning

This study examines how Viet Cong’s warfare in South Vietnam can be understood beyond the concept of asymmetric warfare, which is often used to explain conflicts between unequal actors but may overlook the strategic logic of non-Western actors. The aim is to analyse Viet Cong’s strategy through Mao Zedong’s theory of people’s war. By applying a non-Eurocentric theoretical framework to a non-Eurocentric case, the study seeks to deepen the understanding of the conditions under which such a strategy can develop and function in practice. The study is conducted as a qualitative case study based on document analysis of both primary and secondary sources. The analysis focuses on three key components: the role of the population, indirect strategy, and protracted warfare. The results show that Mao’s theory has strong explanatory power in understanding central aspects of Viet Cong’s warfare. In particular, the importance of the population, the use of guerrilla tactics, and the strategy of prolonged conflict are clearly reflected in the empirical material. However, the findings also indicate that the theory does not fully capture the complexity of the conflict, as additional political, social, and contextual factors influenced the development and outcome of the war.