Anpassning av beredskapszoner för små modulära reaktorer (SMR) : En komparativ studie av Sverige, Kanada och Storbritannien

Sammanfattning

The need for new nuclear power in Sweden has increased interest in the establishment of small modular reactors (SMRs), which can contribute to fossil-free and dispatchable electricity production and also be used for applications such as district heating, hydrogen production, and industrial process heat. These applications mean that SMRs may need to be located closer to urban areas and industrial end users than today’s large-scale nuclear power plants. This raises the question of how emergency planning zones should be designed for future SMR facilities, since Sweden’s current zones are dimensioned for existing large nuclear power plants, with an inner emergency planning zone of 5 kilometres and an outer zone of 25 kilometres. This study explores the possibility of adapting current emergency planning zones for SMRs through a risk-informed and graded approach, and compares the Swedish system with those of Canada and the United Kingdom. The study is based on document studies and semistructured interviews with relevant actors at national, regional, municipal, and international levels. A thematic analysis was used to identify differences in regulations, allocation of responsibilities, and practical implementation between the countries, with a focus on how technical safety analyses are connected to decisions regarding the extent of emergency planning zones. The results show that Canada and the United Kingdom use more developed methods for adapting emergency planning zones to the specific risk profile of a facility. In the United Kingdom, the operator prepares a consequence assessment, which then forms the basis for local emergency planning, while zoning in Canada is more clearly linked to the facility’s complexity and potential dose consequences. Although Sweden has a more standardised system, there is still potential to adapt emergency planning zones for future types of facilities, as the regulatory framework allows for flexibility. An important conclusion is that SMRs cannot justify smaller emergency planning zones solely because of their smaller reactor size. Instead, the extent of emergency planning zones must be justified through technical analyses of the source term, dose consequences, and passive safety systems, while also considering local conditions and the overall risk associated with multi-module facilities. The study therefore shows that Sweden needs to develop clearer methods for how SMR-specific risks should be analysed, verified, and used in practical emergency planning.