Offentliggöranden av underrättelser i hybridhotens tid

Sammanfattning

This thesis examines how Swedish intelligence actors use intelligence disclosures as strategic communication to address hybrid threats. The study applies a qualitative document analysis to the Swedish Security Service’s and Swedish Military Security and Intelligence Service’s open annual reports and yearly assessments from 2015 and 2024. The material is analysed using Nato’s framework for intelligence-based disclosures in strategic communication, focusing on which purposes carry the main argumentation and how hybrid threats are framed. The findings indicate a clear shift over time. In 2015, problem definition and legitimisation dominate through power and influence and institutionally grounded credibility. By 2024, attribution and deterrence become more salient through clearer naming of actors, an emphasis on deniability in the cyber domain, and a stronger link to threshold-raising policy logics such as security protection and regulatory control instruments. Differences between the two organisations are partly explained by their distinct mandates and target audiences. The thesis also highlights the disclosure dilemma between selective transparency and the protection of sources and methods.