Dynamiken mellan politiska incitament och institutionell styrning : Principal–agent-ansvar kring den växande Kriminalvården

Sammanfattning

Purpose: The purpose of the study is to describe how decisionmakers manage the balance between political incentives and the effective governance of the Prison and Probation Service during its expansion, with a focus on institutional inertia. Research questions: How do decision-makers navigate between loyalty towards the principal and the responsibility to drive change within inert institutions? - In what ways are transactional and transformational leadership ideals expressed in the navigation between political goals and the agency’s operational prerequisites? - How is the trust in the state leadership affected by its ability to balance principal-agent responsibility, given the security requirements of the Prison and Probation Service as a rule-of-law agency? Method: A qualitative approach was applied, and semi-structured interviews were conducted. Theory and empirical data have been analyzed using an abductive approach through thematic analysis. Conclusion: This study shows that political pressure during the expansion period clashes with the Prison and Probation Service’s governance and needs, creating challenges due to the institutional inertia that characterizes the agency.