Kärnvapenspelet: En studie av Frankrikes, Rysslands och USA:s kärnvapendoktriner

Sammanfattning

This study examines similarities and differences between the nuclear doctrines of France, Russia and the United States, and how these can be interpreted through Thomas Schelling’s framework on credibility, deterrence and risk. The study is based on a qualitative comparative content analysis of official doctrinal documents, focusing on purpose, nuclear capability and conditions of use. The results show that all three states frame nuclear weapons as tools of deterrence. However, the United States combines broad deterrence with alliance commitments and detailed descriptions of its nuclear triad, Russia provides explicit and rule-based scenarios for nuclear use tied to specific military threats, and France relies on strategic ambiguity by leaving its “vital interests” undefined and emphasizing uncertainty as a deterrence mechanism. The theoretical analysis furthermore shows that these results can be interpreted as different deterrence strategies. The study provides a contemporary comparative perspective on three nuclear powers, contributing new insights into today’s nuclear deterrence and security politics and lays foundations for further research on nuclear doctrines.