Restaurera naturen eller bevara makten? - En kvalitativ innehållsanalys om subsidiaritetsprincipen som ett politiskt legitimeringsverktyg kring EU:s naturrestaureringslag

Sammanfattning

The principle of subsidiarity has a central role in EU environmental governance, formally serving as a legal-mechanism for allocating decision-making between the Union and its member states. This thesis examines how the principle functions during the legislative process, with the newly implemented EU Nature Restoration Law (Regulation (EU) 2024/1991) as the specific case, arguing that it operates less as a legal rule and more as an instrument for political gain. Through a qualitative content analysis of a single case, the study examines the European Commission’s justification for the law alongside the opposition of the six member states that voted against it in June 2024. The analysis is based on Golub’s theory of subsidiarity as rhetoric, Jordan and Jeppesen’s thesis that politics drives the use of the principle as well as Scharpf’s distinction between input- and output-oriented legitimacy. The theoretical foundation is developed further by using three indicators - function, connection and consistency, which contributes to the assessment of whether each actor’s argumentation is substantive or strategic. The findings show that the Commission applies a maximalist interpretation to legitimize centralization, while opposition states invoke the principle in highly varied ways. Only Sweden formally invoked subsidiarity through a reasoned opinion, while the others relied on proportionality, parliamentary mandate, sectoral concerns or economic objections. A central paradox emerges: the state using the principle most formally uses it least instrumentally, while the most instrumental uses display the weakest connection to the law. The study concludes that the principle of subsidiarity functions as a political tool rather than a clear, legal rule.