Verification and Welfare : Evaluating the Impact of Peace Agreement Implementation on Post-Conflict Education Outcomes

Sammanfattning

This thesis examines whether the implementation of verification mechanisms in peace agreements influences welfare outcomes in post-conflict countries. The core problem that is addressed is the gap in understanding how post-conflict countries allocate fiscal resources. The research question is as follows: Does implementation of verification mechanisms in comprehensive peace agreements increase welfare spending in post-conflict states? The thesis goes beyond current literature that has established that such mechanisms can reduce military expenditure and focuses on whether verification mechanisms redirects it towards social development. A panel data analysis of 29 post-conflict countries between 1989 and 2015 was conducted using a fixed effects model (and a random effects model for robustness testing). The primary independent variable is verification implementation level and the dependent variable is school enrollment as a proxy for welfare spending. The initial bivariate results suggested a positive relationship, however as control variables were included the relationship was no longer statistically significant. Instead factors such as residual violence and time since conflict had a greater impact. These results have both academic and policy implications. It suggests that institutional safeguards, such as verification mechanisms, alone are not sufficient to shift fiscal priorities towards welfare investment and that it has to be complemented with other measures.