Fastighetsmäklarens rådgivningsansvar vid användning av provisionstrappa : En rättslig analys av god fastighetsmäklarsed och risken för vilseledande rådgivning

Sammanfattning

Research question: “How can commission tier structures affect the real estate agent’s incentives in relation to the client’s interests, and to what extent can the use of commission tiers create risks of misleading advice in connection with real estate brokerage?” Purpose of study: The purpose is to analyze how commission tier structures relate to the real estate agent’s advisory responsibility and the principle of good real estate practice. Methodology: The study applies a legal dogmatic method, complemented by a law and economics approach and elements of legal analysis. Theoretical framework: Principal-agent theory, information asymmetry, moral hazard, and utility maximization. Legal framework: Commission tier structures in practice, advisory responsibility, good real estate brokerage practice, and the precedential value of FMI supervisory decisions. Result: The study shows that commission tier structures are generally accepted within Swedish real estate brokerage law, but that this compensation model may create incentive conflicts through information asymmetry, principal-agent problems, and moral hazard. Conclusion: Commission tier structures are not necessarily incompatible with the real estate agent’s advisory responsibilities or good real estate brokerage practice, but they may create risks of conflicts of interest and misleading advice, highlighting the importance of transparency and clear information disclosure.